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TRUMPING POLITICS: THE ROBERTS COURT AND
"JUDICIAL" REVIEW
Gene Nichol*
I am delighted, I think, to write about the Roberts Court and its theories of judicial
review. God knows any treatment could be pithy, and brief. I'm not sure the Roberts
Court could easily be accused of theorizing. It seems now, more accurately, merely to
sign up, to choose sides. The justices wield power, like other brokers - just to greater
consequence, and duration. It is lovely, and, I'd guess hugely fulfilling, to discover that
the U.S. Constitution codifies, permanently, one's most deeply felt political
predilections. And how delightful it must be to learn that the outcomes one's ideological
companions have urged since you met them in law school are, in fact, after all,
compelled by foundational constitutional commitment - enforceable in every American
venue, high and low, schooled and un-schooled, bumbling and urbane. Heady validation
that. No wonder Sam Alito takes such umbrage at criticism from the likes of an
unperfected Barack Obama. Didn't he notice the robe? And does he not know that these
aggressive Justices will be there, working their now-vaunted will, long, long after he's
gone?
But, perhaps, I get ahead of myself.
I will explore the Roberts Court through the lens of its two most famous cases,
Citizens United v. Federal Election CommissionI and District of Columbia v. Heller.2
Unfair? Perhaps. Certainly these rulings are not broadly representative. No court re-casts
the legal landscape every day. None would have the energy, or the stomach, for that.
Even God rested after six days. And surely, if only to re-charge partisan batteries, the
most thoroughly lathered ideologues must, on occasion, turn their attentions to the dusty
and the mundane. So, I would concede, much of the Roberts Court's work product is less
stunning and less, how to put it, vile, than these paired landmarks.
But whether what we refer to as "The Roberts Court" lasts another fortnight, or
another decade, or two, or more, Citizens United and Heller will punctuate and define its
challenging legacy. And that legacy will again mark the U.S. Supreme Court as an
institution deployed to trump the democratic operation of the American political process.
That has, no doubt, happened before.3 It is more unseemly, of course, when majoritarian
* Professor of Law and Director, Center on Poverty, Work & Opportunity, University of North Carolina,
President Emeritus, College of William & Mary.
1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. 544 U.S. 570 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating child labor laws).
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frameworks are cast aside in favor of the dissenting claims of the privileged and the
powerful. But that, too, has before marked our history.4 This time, though, the justices'
eyes seem to be opened wide. They have decided, unreservedly, to dance with those who
"brung 'em." In opting for political, and even partisan power - in coming so visibly out
of the closet - the slim Roberts Court majority has permanently tainted whatever is the
remainder of its work. So perhaps a tight compass around these two unfortunate products
is justified, or, at least excusable.
I. DECIDING CITIZENS UNITED
Citizens United, as it is now very widely known, began as a challenge to the
application of federal laws prohibiting corporations from using their treasury general
funds to engage in "electioneering communications."s The non-profit corporation
plaintiff sought constitutional protection for advertisements purportedly hawking a
disparaging "documentary" about Hillary Clinton. Though Citizens United had dropped
its broad-ranging facial challenge to the statutes, the Supreme Court launched one of its
own - ordering re-argument, reaching well beyond the litigants' claims, and asking,
ominously, whether an array of its central campaign finance precedents should be
overruled.7 Answering the invitation enthusiastically, Justice Anthony Kennedy's 8
majority opinion concluded, for the first time in American history, that corporations
enjoy an inviolate free speech right to spend unlimited amounts of money from their
ample treasuries to sway the outcome of candidate elections.9 Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commercelo (fully) and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission1
(partially) were overruled - thus removing any "basis for allowing the Government to
limit corporate independent expenditures."1 2
4. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
5. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
6. Id. at 887-92.
7. Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009).
8. This essay makes the intemperate claim that the Roberts Court majority has become an extraordinarily
interventionist, activist, ideological, and even partisan force in our present structure of government. I claim the
Court's decisions are frequently reckless intrusions on the operation of the American democratic process -
risky ventures that threaten both majoritarian decision-making processes and the Court. This broad change, by
now, wraps rather easily around the efforts of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts. I
would not make the same radicalized claim about Justice Kennedy. He wrote the Citizens United opinion and
embraced the Court's conclusions in District of Columbia v. Heller. But he also wrote Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating Texas's harsh anti-homosexual sodomy law) and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723 (2008) (applying rights to habeas corpus to detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). These are hardly the
handiwork of a hard-right political ideologue. My candid assessment in cases like Citizens United and Heller is
that Justice Kennedy is badly mistaken rather than purposefully partisan. His quirkiness, though, regularly
enables the forced ideological march of Roberts, Alito, Scalia, and Thomas. In that capacity, he does immense
damage to the commonwealth and to the Court as an institution.
9. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886.
10. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). In Austin, the Court upheld restrictions on political speech based on the speaker's
corporate status. Id. at 660. The Citizens United Court expressly overruled this holding. Citizens United, 130 S.
Ct. at 913.
I1. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). McConnell relied in part on Austin to affirm federal prohibitions on "electioneering
communications." Id. at 206. To the extent that McConnell relied on the Austin holding, that case was
overruled as well. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
12. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882.
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As lynchpin, the opinion determined, without apparent irony, that "the proposition
that ... the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers" has no
place in American law.13 The previously often-stated concern that "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of [corporate] wealth" might pose significant
barriers to the effective operation of egalitarian democracy was discarded as paternalistic
and repressive. 14 Rejecting over a century of law that the Court now apparently
considered as reflecting a "censorship ... vast in its reach," 15 Justice Kennedy argued
that corporate-funded speech is essential to assure "that the people have access to the
views of every group in the community." 16
The Citizens United Court then grounded its holding in a distinction that no one
who has ever been involved in politics believes to be true: "[t]he absence of
prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate" " . . defeats
concerns for corruption or the appearance of corruption, and eliminates the risk of
improper influence on or commitments by candidates." 1 7 This was followed by a
comment that caused many in the public arena to shake their heads - "[t]he appearance
of influence or access . .. will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy." 18
Accordingly, corporations and unions now enjoy an unfettered liberty to spend
whatever they may choose in federal, state, and local elections for legislators, executives,
and judges. The ruling is breathtaking in both its sweep and departure. Almost as if to
mock and humiliate generations of campaign reformers across the nation, Justice
Kennedy reached a crescendo by citing Mr. Smith Goes to Washington to illustrate,
apparently, the utter democratic necessity of pouring more corporate money into our
politics.19 A notable tour de force.
After Citizens United, as the New York Times has reported, lobbyists can feel free
to "tell any elected official: if you vote wrong, my company ... will spend unlimited
sums advertising explicitly against your re-election."20 It renders all campaign
contribution limits silly and futile. What sense does it make to say that a citizen is
prohibited from giving more than two or three or four or five-thousand dollars to a
campaign, while corporations and unions down the road can spend many millions
unmolested? It's not hard to guess that swamping the entire system of contribution
limitation is the central purpose of Citizens United. The Roberts Court thus ruled,
implicitly, that the American democracy is literally powerless to fight back against the
scourge of cash register politics. That conclusion, of course, is demeaning to both our
national history and purpose.
13. Id. at 883.
14. Id. (citations omitted) (brackets in original).
15. Id. at 884.
16. Id. at 901 (citiations omitted).
17. Id. at 908 (citations omitted).
18. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
19. Id. at 916-17.
20. David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent Weapon in Campaign Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at
Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22donate.html.
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II. HELLER
In District of Columbia v. Heller,21 as is almost equally well known, the Roberts
Court struck down a law that banned the possession of hand guns in the troubled nation's
capital. Splitting again 5-4, the justices concluded that the Second Amendment assures,
despite its prefatory language, an individual right to own firearms, unconnected with
service in a militia.22 Upsetting, once more, the settled legal understandings of over a
century, the same five-member 23 majority ruled that individual self-defense is "the
central component" of the Second Amendment right to bear arms. 24 This time, with
Justice Scalia writing, the Court employed a perhaps-odd historical focus - measuring
what, despite the text of the contested amendment, the framers of the provision "most
undoubtedly thought ... even more important[:] ... self-defense and hunting." 25
Although he conceded that the newly ascribed right to arms could not be considered
absolute, Justice Scalia overtly rejected any balancing of interests to determine a
regulation's acceptability. He thus refused to consider any empirical evidence proffered
to justify firearm restrictions. 26 The Second Amendment, he crowed, "elevates above all
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home."27 The D.C. provision, therefore, did not stand a chance.
The sweep of Justice Scalia's move, and its implications for the future of gun
control, were impressive:
The very enumeration of the right takes it out of the hands of government - even the
Third Branch of Government - the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the
right is really worth insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges'
assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are
enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them,
whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.28
This is true, as well, apparently, for a right at odds with the text of a constitutional
provision, discovered belatedly by a judge employing "law office" history,29 to reveal
interests "undoubtedly thought ... even more important" to the framers than those they
chose to write down. We have had, of course, a good measure of difficulty with this
methodology in the jurisprudence of the eleventh amendment.30  But, niceties
notwithstanding, in one afternoon Justice Scalia's newly-minted version of the Second
Amendment went from last place in our long-developed hierarchy of constitutional
21. 554 U.S. 570.
22. Id. at 624-26.
23. Id. at 572. Justice Scalia's majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Chief
Justice Roberts. Justice Stevens, as in Citizens United, filed a principal dissenting opinion. It was joined by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
24. Id. at 599 (emphasis omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 634- 36.
27. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
28. Id. at 634-35.
29. See Jeffrey Shaman, The Wages of Originalist Sin: District of Columbia v. Heller, AMERICAN
CONSTITTION SOCIETY (Sept. 2008), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Shaman%20Issue%2OBrief.pdf.
30. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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values, to first. Impressive work, grand in stature.3 1
With its companion piece, McDonald v. City of Chicago,32 Heller has triggered a
bevy of lawsuits aimed at an array of the reported 20,000 gun control laws in the United
States.33 It is stunning, and surely eventually tragic, to contemplate that amidst the
challenges of twenty-first century American life, the power of legislatures to deal with
the dangers of firearms has been dramatically diminished. Ultimately, Heller may
invalidate more statutes thought essential by legislative majorities across the nation than
any judicial decision in our history.
III. ON NEUTRAL REFEREES
Chief Justice John Roberts professed in his confirmation hearing's opening salvo,
now somewhat notoriously, that:
Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are like
umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge
is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody
ever went to a ball game to see the umpire. Judges have to have the humility to recognize
that they operate within a system of precedent, shaped by other judges equally striving to
live up to the judicial oath. And judges have to have the modesty to be open in the
decisional process to the considered views of their colleagues on the bench.34
Reading Roberts's vacuous and hypocritical homily with the benefit of hindsight
can, of course, leave one breathless, and nauseated. Never has there been so wide a
chasm between the jurist calculatingly advertised and the one subsequently, knowingly,
delivered. Even Justice Scalia has marveled at his new colleague's' disingenuous
window-dressing - asserting, in exasperation, that "this last pretense of minimalism," 3 5
this "faux judicial restraint" is simply "judicial obfuscation." 36
No one, literally no one, reading Citizens United and Heller could even approach
the conclusion that the Roberts Five are behaving like modest, neutral arbiters -
applying the rules, not making them; servants of text and process and precedent; cautious
umpires, exercising only limited visions of judicial power. Hungrily casting aside
precedent, reaching boldly beyond the actual cases presented, employing the widest
possible compass, invalidating acts of Congress and state legislatures at whim and by
boatload, constitutionalizing arenas of vibrant political controversy, weighing in
potently, decidedly, in the interests and causes of previous political benefactors, the
31. Heller, of course, imposed a categorical personal Second Amendment right in the District of Columbia.
it did not speak to the enforceability of the Second Amendment against state and local governments.
Unsurprisingly, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), the Roberts Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against state and local governments.
32. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment is incorporated against the states).
33. Tina Mehr & Adam Winkler, The Standardless Second Amendment, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
SOCIETY (Oct. 2010),
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Mehr/ 20and%2OWinkler/2OStandardless%2OSecond%20Amendment.pdf.
34. CNN POLITICS, Roberts: 'My job is to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat,' (Sept. 12, 2005),
http://articles.cnn.com/2005-09-12/politics/roberts.statement _judicial-role-judges-judicial-
oath? s=PM:POLITICS [hereinafter Roberts Statement].
35. Hien v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 630 (2007).
36. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 499 (2007) (Scalia, J. concurring) (in decision denying
standing to challenge religious expenditures by the executive branch of the federal government).
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Roberts tribunal embodies activism writ large. Imagine if Chief Justice Roberts had,
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, professed his intention to repeatedly ditch
centuries of settled law, invalidating the fruits of the democratic process, without textual
warrant, without historical justification, without a shred of precedent, without even the
request of the parties, in order to further his particularized political ideology and to
solidify the power of the strongest economic forces in the nation. At least it would have
made for an interesting hearing.
Of course, John Roberts is neither the first nor, sadly, the last judicial nominee to
portray himself in dramatically different terms than his behavior on the high court would
justify. It could be our hope, though, that the absurd and astonishing disconnection
between his words and his deeds of leadership would be enough to force us to drop the
"modest," "restrained," "passive," "non-activist," "rule applying," and "neutral referee"
jargon from our political lexicon. There are no restrained, deferential, passive jurists on
the U.S. Supreme Court. There have not been for decades. And it now appears that the
more jurists mouth the phrases of restraint, the more decidedly they act to violate them. It
is beyond time to turn the conversation in different directions.
IV. ON OCCASIONAL ORIGINALISM
If Justice Scalia can be forgiven for tiring of Chief Justice Roberts's "faux
restraint," the rest of us might, as well, be given a pass for losing patience with Scalia's
feints toward originalism. His positions, in both Citizens United and Heller, are
assertedly based in history - the demonstrated intentions of the framers and ratifiers of
the First and Second Amendments. I will not rehearse the arguments here. But, in short,
Justice Scalia finds apparently potent links between the framing generation's designs for
constitutionally secured "freedom of speech" and a derivative right of modem mega-
corporations to spend millions of dollars to affect the political process.3 7 This, despite
the remarkable hopscotch required to move from legislators who would, undoubtedly,
not have regarded corporations as "persons" or money as "speech" - to the
Amendment's boldly worded, and absolutely framed, guarantees. 38 In Heller, on the
other hand, he inverts the ordering of the language of the Second Amendment, removes
the guiding premise of the preamble, and discovers a non-textual purpose for the
provision which he deems more central to the framers' intentions than anything they
happened to write down. 39
It is not that these aren't impressive moves. As proof of dexterity, they no doubt
astound. But originalism is designed to be an interpretive theory of constraint. It cabins,
purportedly, the freewheeling ability of adventurous judges to deploy the capacious
phrases of the American constitution to suit their own value-based predispositions.
Accordingly, it prevents unelected judges from stepping beyond their appointed
constitutional authorities.
Justice Scalia's originalist moves in Citizens United and Heller, in operation,
though, make mockery of any identifiable concept of restraint. His use of history is
37. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (2010) (Scalia, J. concurring).
38. Id
39. Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
426 Vol. 46:421
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 46 [2010], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol46/iss3/4
TRUMPING POLITICS
almost taunting. It says, most evidently: See, I'm the smartest guy around and I can make
the history of the framing do anything, literally anything, I want. The only thing history
cannot do, apparently, is lead to a conclusion contrary to Justice Scalia's present political
predispositions. That is the one impossible step. Beyond that, he can take the valise of
history in any direction required.
In Heller and Citizens United, Justice Scalia used history to prove that the
constitution means something other than what it actually says. In Printz v. United States,
on the other hand, he used history to construct, from whole cloth, a constitutional barrier
enjoying no textual foundation whatsoever - which also flew in the face of an array of
accepted founding era practices.40 But even these manipulations are easier to
comprehend than his ready and unexplained willingness, when essential, to abandon
historical inquiry altogether - as in the federal affirmative action cases - where no
matter how nimble, it is beyond impossible to attribute to Madison and crew either an
equal protection principle or a cultural aversion to race discrimination. Under such
circumstances, apparently, the correct course is to forget the demands of originalism
completely. Only then, one supposes, is it possible to invalidate a federal contracting
racial set-aside. 4 1 Thus, we are now required to develop not only a theory of originalism
that is comprehensible and constraining, but also a test to dictate when originalism will
be deployed and when it will be casually and silently discarded. This, in short, is a
slalom that none but Justice Scalia could successfully navigate. And even he should be
required to explain its implementation.
It would be better by now to simply curb these enthusiastic but disingenuous
declarations of fealty to theories of original intention. There are, assuredly, no practicing
originalists on the U.S. Supreme Court. Nor, one doubts, one hopes, will there ever be.
V. TRUMPING DEMOCRACY
If Heller and Citizens United spring from neither text nor history nor precedent,
what is their studied genesis? What theory of constitutional interpretation do they
implement? What foundational values or processes lie at their core? If it is "emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"42 what basis for
such bold and path-breaking exercises ofjudicial authority is declaimed?
In broad terms, the answer is a mystery; though, quite clearly, Justices Scalia and
Kennedy would cling to the mantle of textualism, even if the language and the history of
their respective constitutional phrases are at war with their vigorous conclusions. What is
clear, though, is that Heller and Citizens United can find no respite in theories of
democratic failure that often sustain potent exercises of judicial intervention. 43 The
40. Printz v.United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See also Gene Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case:
The Trials of an Occasional Originalist, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 953 (1999).
41. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (invalidating
the federal racial minority set-aside program).
42. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
43. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating statutory scheme requiring female,
but not male, members of the armed services to prove their spouses' dependent status in order to qualify for
certain benefits); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating state law mandating public schooling
as violative of the religious freedom of Amish and Mennonite petitioners); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(invalidating a state electoral districting scheme which gave unequal representation to certain voting groups);
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members and leadership of the National Rifle Association are not classic "discrete and
insular" minorities, removed and cordoned from the channels of American political
power. Quite the contrary. And, of course, Citizens United makes a literal mockery of the
concept. No one wields greater political clout in this country than corporate interests of
massive wealth.4 4 The perennial question for the modern American democracy is
whether citizens without great economic majesty can manage, by any measure, to make
their preferences even register in our deliberative processes. With the largest gulfs
between rich and poor in the western industrial world firmly secured 45 and growing, the
richest among us seem to fare well in our cash-register democracy.46 It is an
extraordinarily long road, in other words, from United States v. Carolene Products's
famous footnote 47 to the privilege-based jurisprudence of the Roberts Court.
The hyper-activism of the present U.S. Supreme Court is seemingly more
accurately rooted in a pointed set of ideological preferences - coinciding noticeably
with proffered and treasured values of the political right. A working majority of the
Roberts Court - obviously in Citizens United and Heller - has chosen to carry
constitutional water in the name of economic political privilege and an unfettered, near-
absurd access to firearms. It is difficult to believe that any five persons - no matter
where sought - could survey the landscape of modern American life and determine that
the two touchstones for which we should abandon long-asserted claims of process and
principle in a determined rush to new outcomes at any cost would be to put more guns on
the streets and more money in our politics. Truth is, indeed, sometimes stranger than
fiction. But that is the U.S. Supreme Court we now enjoy.
It would not be possible, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, to secure
a vote by the majority of Americans, or their elected representatives, for untrammeled,
categorical, near-absolute gun rights. Nor would anything like a majority of our citizenry
opt to open the floodgates to cascades of new corporate money in our politics. These
notions may go over enthusiastically in various hard-right caucuses or in the halls of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, but they are not the accepted fare for the bulk of us. In
constitutionalizing these controverted and openly ideological claims, the Roberts Court
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating racial segregation in public schools). See also JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 88-104 (1980).
44. See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: How WASHINGTON MADE THE
RICH RICHER-AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 65-66 (2010); ROBERT G. KAISER, So DAMN
MUCH MONEY: THE TRIUMPH OF LOBBYING AND THE CORROSION OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2010).
45. See INEQUALITY MATTERS: THE GROWING ECONOMIC DIVIDE IN AMERICA AND ITS POISONOUS
CONSEQUENCES (James Lardner & David Alden Smith, eds., 2005); RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT,
THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 15-18 (2009).
46. KAISER, supra note 44.
47. 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than
are most other types of legislation....
Nor need we enquire whether similar conclusions enter into the review of statutes directed at
particular religious .. . or national . . . or racial minorities.. . . [W]hether prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
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has, in effect, come out of the closet. It talks, sheepishly, of deference, restraint,
modesty, and process. Yet it acts, wolfishly, in service of the political benefactors that
brought it to power. And in the years ahead, it is not unreasonable to assume that the
politically-driven platform will move beyond guns and money to school desegregation,48
affirmative action,4 9 abortion,50 and voting rights.5 1 It is no small irony that our high
court appears set to cast its lot in favor of an array of partisan causes that might have
enjoyed majority appeal a decade, or two decades, or three decades ago - but not now.
Our justices are not only activist and ideological, they are, apparently, dated and stale.
When Chief Justice Roberts appeared before the Senate he focused pointedly on
his existential commitment to humility. Judges are "servants," he intoned; they play "a
limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire." 52 Judges "have to have
the humility to recognize that they operate within a system of precedent" and "the
modesty to be open . . . to the considered view of their colleagues." 53 But Chief Justice
Roberts and the bulk of his majority colleagues have displayed, instead, a remarkable
and reckless hubris rarely witnessed on our greatest tribunal. Justice Alito has engaged in
something of a personal snit with the president of the United States - appearing more
like a mid-level Federalist Society partisan than a member of the United States Supreme
Court. Justices Thomas and Scalia have pushed the envelope of off-the-bench political
engagement - participating in partisan and ideological attachments that must make their
colleagues shudder. And the Chief Justice has taken to new heights a careless willingness
to completely segregate his packaging from his product - travelling the nation
professing a touching reticence as he crafts decision after decision meant to re-cast the
American constitution in the image of his politics.
This is risky business. The working assumption seems to be that most Americans
see the world through the eyes of the right edge of the Republican Party. Surely then, the
interests and the sentiments of a democracy-trumping U.S. Supreme Court will
ultimately prevail. But the Roberts Five are hardly representative of the diversity,
challenge, condition, circumstance, and possibility of American life. They travel in
extraordinarily confined quarters. In their insularity, in their ideology, in their remove, in
their intense and unapologetic arrogance, they threaten the Court and the people it is
meant to serve.
48. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
49. See id. See also Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337
(2003).
50. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007) (sustaining Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003).
51. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
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